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Darling: Darling: Setting the Standard for Overturning an Arbitrator's Award That Violates Public Policy

SETTING THE STANDARD FOR
OVERTURNING AN
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD THAT
VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY
United PaperworkersInternational v. Misco, Inc.1
I. INTRODUCTION

For over forty years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the principle that great deference is to be given by the courts to the
decisions of arbitrators.2 The Court has applied this same deferential
standard in reviewing arbitration awards which are challenged on the basis
of being in violation of public policy.3 The well settled rule is that a court
must enforce the award unless it violates a well defined, explicit public
policy that is ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interest."4 Recently, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this longstanding rule in United Paperworkers
International v. Misco, Inc.5 In doing so, the Court strengthened the
arbitrator's authority by laying down a tough two part analysis to be used
in determining whether an award can be overturned based on public policy.6
The Court held that not only must the policy be well defined and ascertainable from legal precedent, but the violation must be clearly shown.'
II.

THE HISTORY OF GREAT DEFERENCE

The Court has looked to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration
as the basis for giving great deference to arbitration awards. The legislature
has expressed a marked preference for arbitration under collective bargain-

1. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
2. See Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1945); Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983); AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649-50
(1986).
3. See Muschany, 324 U.S. at 65-66; WR Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
4. Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66.
5. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
6. Id at 373-74.
7. Id
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ing agreements. The Labor Management Relations Act,8 passed by Congress
in 1947, expresses the clear preference for arbitration. 9 The courts promote
these objectives by giving extreme deference to the arbitrator's decision. If
not, the policy of fostering arbitration could be undermined by potentially
intrusive judicial review." This policy is so firm that courts cannot question
the arbitrator's findings of fact or his award unless the award is not drawn
from the bargaining agreement."
The United States Supreme Court issued the standard for setting aside
contracts that violate public policy more than 40 years ago. In Muschany
v. United States," the Court held that for an award to be overturned based
on public policy, the policy must be stated with "[r]eference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interest.""3 The Court reaffirmed this standard nearly forty years later in
W.I. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759.4 However, the analysis was not
uniformly followed."3 In fact, the Court in Misco granted certiorari because
the courts of appeal were divided on when an arbitrator's award violated
public policy.
In United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 6 the
First Circuit Court of Appeals applied a rather liberal standard in reviewing
an award. The court overturned an arbitrator's award that reinstated a post
office employee who embezzled from the post office. The court defined

8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-201 (1982). Section 173(d) states, "[fqinal adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement."
9. 29 U.S.C. § 173(e) states, "[tlo encourage and support the establishment and operation
of joint labor management activities conducted by plant, area and industry wide committees
designed to improve labor management relationships, job security and organizational
effectiveness."
10. See Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l., 808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cerr. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1751 (1988).
11. See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 370.
12. 324 U.S. 49 (1945).
13. Id at 66.
14. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
15. Some courts have taken a strict view of the test and have favored the policy of
arbitration even when it conflicts with other laws. See Bevies Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986,
791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). Other courts have taken
a more modified approach and have weighed policies that might conflict with the arbitrator's
award. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, Inc., 790 F.2d
611 (7th Cir. 1986). Still other courts have adopted common sense approaches. See United
States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
16. 736 F.2d 822 (1984).
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7
public policy with reference to law and precedents in making its decision.1
However, the court also considered the "common sense implications" of
upholding the arbitrator's decision. t8 The court reasoned that the general
deterrent effect of preventing crime would be hurt if the arbitrator's ruling
were upheld. t9
Other courts have given a strict interpretation to the WR Grace
analysis and have upheld the arbitrator's award even when it conflicts with
other laws. In Bevies Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986,2 the company fired
two employees because of their immigration status. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that an arbitrator's decision granting reinstatement and back
pay to two undocumented aliens did not violate a clearly defined public
policy and was not in manifest disregard of the law as there was no law
against hiring illegal aliens.2 t The dissent criticized the majority's reasoning,
stating that the arbitrator should have tried to reconcile labor law with the
In the Misco case, the Fifth Circuit Court of
illegal immigration laws.'
Appeals held that the public policy against operating dangerous machinery
by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol warranted overruling the
arbitrator's award. 23 The court so concluded based on evidence that
marijuana gleanings were found in the employee's automobile, even though
no evidence was presented that the employee ever operated a dangerous
machine while under the influence of drugs.' The particular facts in Misco
and the continued division among the circuits on when an award may be set
aside as contravening public policy caused the Court to hear the case."

17. Id at 825. The Court cited 39 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982), postal employee swears to uphold
his duties; 18 U.S.C. § 500 (1982), statute under which Cote was convicted. In so examining
these laws, the Court said that the offense in this case went to the "heart of the worker's
responsibilities." US. Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 825.
18. US. Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 825.
19. Id The Court noted that other postal employees may feel less reason to uphold their
duties if they believed the Union could fix the problem. Id
20. 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986).
21. Id at 1392-93.
22. Id at 1393.
23. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l. Union, 768 F.2d 739 (1985), rev'd, 108 S. Ct.
364 (1987).
24. Id at 740-41.
25. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 367.
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III. THE MIsco CASE
The parties to the suit entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which covered the production and maintenance employees at the plant.
Under the agreement, the parties were bound by the arbitrator's decision
concerning any arbitrable matter.' Management had the right under the
bargaining agreement to establish and enforce rules and regulations relating
to discipline or discharge and the procedures for imposing discipline.27 For
nearly ten years, Misco's rules had listed as causes for discharge bringing
intoxicants, narcotics, or controlled substances on plant premises or
consuming the same on plant premises, as well as reporting for work under
the influence of these substances.' The Court noted that the company was
very concerned about drug use at the plant at the time of the events in the
case (particularly on the night shift),29
Isaiah Cooper was employed by the company and worked on the night
shift at its paper converting plant in Monroe, Louisiana. He operated a
slitter-rewinder machine which uses sharp blades to cut rolling coils of
paper. The machine had caused numerous injuries in recent years." Cooper
had been reprimanded twice within a period of only a few months for
deficient performance."1 On January 21, 1983, the day after the second
reprimand, the police searched Cooper's house and found a substantial
amount of marijuana.32 On that same day, the police kept Cooper's car
under observation at Misco's parking lot. During a work break later that
same evening, Cooper was apprehended in the back seat of another car with
marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted marijuana cigarette in the front
seat ashtray.33 The police then went and searched Cooper's car and found
a plastic scales case and marijuana gleanings. 4 Cooper was arrested and
charged with marijuana possession.
On January 24, 1983, Cooper informed the company that he had been
arrested for marijuana possession at his home. On January 27, the company
learned a few days later that Cooper had been arrested on company
premises. Misco investigated and fired Cooper 11 days later for violating the

26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 368 n.2.
29. Id at 368.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Id
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rule against having drugs on the property.3' However, when it dismissed
Cooper, the company didn't know that marijuana had also been found in
Cooper's car.' Cooper filed a grievance the same day he was discharged
and the matter proceeded to arbitration.
Misco learned five days before the arbitration hearing that marijuana
had been found in Cooper's car, but didn't inform the Union, which learned
about the matter at the meeting. 7 The arbitrator refused to accept the
evidence of marijuana found in Cooper's car because Misco didn't know this
when it fired Cooper, and therefore, didn't rely on it as a basis for
discharge. The arbitrator then found that the company did not have just
cause to fire Cooper. 9 The arbitrator also concluded that Misco failed to
prove that the employee had possessed or used marijuana on company
property. Cooper was reinstated with back pay and full seniority.4
Misco filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. The district court relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Great Western Food Co.42 and found that the
arbitrator's award contravened public policy and was, therefore, unenforceable.' The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacation of the award
with one judge dissenting." The court of appeals relied primarily on its
holding in Amalgamated to sustain the district court's ruling.45
In Amalgamated, the court overturned an arbitrator's award which
reinstated a truck driver who admitted he had been drinking when he was
involved in an accident. The arbitrator reinstated the driver because the
employer failed to disprove to his satisfaction the driver's claim that
equipment failure and not his drinking had caused the wreck. The court
held that the reinstatement violated the public policy of preventing people

35. Id
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id at 369.
39. Id at 368-69. The arbitrator based his finding that there was not just cause for the
discharge on his consideration of the reasonableness of the employee's position, the notice given
to the employee, the timing of the investigation undertaken, the fairness of the investigation,
the evidence against the employee the possibility of discrimination, and the relation of the
degree of discipline to the nature of the offense and the employee's past record. Id at 368 n.5.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id
Id at 369.
712 F.2d 122 (1983).
Misco, 768 F.2d at 740.
Id at 743 (Tage, J., dissenting)

45. Id at 743.
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from drinking and driving.' The court specifically held that the policy was
sufficiently well defined and definite as the policy against drunk driving is
"embodied in the case law, the applicable regulations, statutory law, and
47
pure common sense."

In Misco, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the arbitrator erred by
narrowly focusing on Cooper's procedural rights, which caused him to
exclude the evidence of marijuana found in Cooper's car because the
company did not rely on the evidence to discharge Cooper.A The court
concluded that considering the public policy against operating dangerous
machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol should have
warranted admitting the evidence.49 The court stated, "[g]azing at the tree,
and oblivious to the forest, the arbitrator has entered an award that is
T h e
plainly contrary to serious and well-founded public policy."50
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, overturned the Fifth Circuit's
ruling. The majority opinion, authored by Justice White, held that the
reviewing court could not refuse enforcement of an arbitrator's award based
on its conclusion that the arbitrator's fact-finding was improvident; 1 that the
reviewing court could not overturn the arbitrator's decision to refuse to
consider evidence unknown to the company at the time the employee was
fired as procedural questions are for the arbitrator; 2 and that the public
policy as relied on by the appellate court did not comply with the
requirement that the policy be ascertained by laws and legal precedents and
not from general consideration of supposed public interests and furthermore,
that no violation of that policy was clearly shown."
The Court looked to the strong federal policy favoring private
settlement of labor disputes in reaching its first conclusion. 4 The Court
reasoned that the reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether the
award draws its essence from the contract.5 The reviewing court cannot
overturn an award simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's factual

46.
47.
48.
49.

Amalgamated, 712 F.2d at 125.
Id
Misco, 768 F.2d at 743.
Id.

50. Id
51. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 371.
52. Id at 371-72.
53. Id. at 373-74.
54. Id at 370 (construing 29 U.S.C.

§

173(d)(1983).

55. I
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findings, contract interpretation, or choice of remedies.56 The Court
concluded that the court of appeals was not free to refuse enforcement57
because it believed the arbitrator's factfinding was "improvident, even silly."
Secondly, the Court ruled that the arbitrator's refusal to consider the
evidence of marijuana in Cooper's car was not a sufficient basis for
overturning the award.5 8 The Court noted the parties were free to lay down
procedural rules for the arbitrator to follow.5 9 The bargaining agreement
left evidentiary matters largely to the arbitrator.6 The arbitrator's decision
to refuse to hear evidence not known to the company at the time of
discharge was within the language of the contract and was wholly consistent
with the practice of other arbitrators.6' The Court held that "[w]hen the
subject matter of a dispute is arbitrable, 'procedural questions' which grow
out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are to be left to the
arbitrator."62
The remainder of this Note will explore the public policy aspect of the
decision. The proper public policy analysis and the great deference given
to an arbitrator in this situation will be explored.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY GUIDELINES

The Supreme Court laid down a two part analysis in applying the public
policy argument. First, the court must find that the arbitrator's award
creates an "explicit conflict" with established law or legal precedent.' The
Court clearly held that the appellate court's opinion as to public policy
based on "general considerations of supposed public interest" would not be

56. Id The Court went on to state "Jals long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced
he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Id at 371.
57. Id
58. Id at 371-72.
59. Id at 371.
60. Id (construing Rule 11.1 of the collective bargaining agreement).
61. Id The Court noted, "[Ilabor arbitrators have stated that the correctness of a
discharge 'must stand or fall upon the reason given at the time of discharge'.., and arbitrators

often, but not always, confine their consideration to the facts known to the employer at the time
of the discharge." Id. at 371 n.8.
62. Id at 372. The Court stated that "[ulnder the Arbitration Act, the federal courts are
empowered to set aside awards only when 'the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy."' Id (quoting 9 U.S.C. §
10(c)(1982)).
63. Id at 373.
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sufficient.' Second, the violation must be "clearly shown" before an award
is refused enforcement."
The first part of the analysis is grounded in the general common law
doctrine that any contract that violates law or public policy is unenforceable." The Supreme Court applied this general doctrine to the collective
bargaining agreement in W.R. Grace.67 However, the Court did state that
the WR. Grace holding did not "sanction a broad judicial power to set aside
arbitration awards as against public policy."" Rather, the holding in W.R.
Grace laid down a strict standard, requiring a violation of "explicit public
policy" that was based on established law or legal precedent. 69 The Court
in Misco reaffirmed this strict standard." The Court held that the court of
appeals did not meet the WR. Grace standard as it "[miade no attempt to
review existing laws and legal precedents in order to demonstrate that they
establish a well 'defined and dominant' policy against the operation of
71
dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs."
The Supreme Court further stated that the Fifth Circuit failed to
comply with the second part of the analysis. The Court noted that even if
the public policy against operating dangerous machinery was proper, there
was no showing that the policy was "clearly violated."' The Court stated
that evidence the arbitrator refused to hear could properly be pursued under
the public policy inquiry. 7 Thus, the Court ruled that the Fifth Circuit did
not err in considering the established fact that traces of marijuana had been
found in Cooper's car.74 However, the Court found that the "assumed
connection" between the marijuana gleanings found in Cooper's car and his
actual use of drugs in the workplace was "tenuous at best" and provided an
insufficient basis for concluding the public policy against operating
dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs was violated. 75 The

64.

d (quoting W.R Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
65. Id at 373-74.
66. Id at 373.
67. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
68. Misco, 108 S.Ct. at 373.
69. Id (construing WR Grace, 461 U.S. at 766).
70. Id at 373-74.
71. Id at 374.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id
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Court concluded that "[a] refusal to enforce an award must rest on more
than speculation." 76
V.

DEFERENCE TO THE ARBITRATOR

The Court in Misco reaffirmed another longstanding precedent. The
Court's holding reaffirmed the great deference given to the arbitrator's
decision on judicial review.' The courts perform a "[v]ery limited [function]
when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator."' The Court went on to state that the courts "[h]ave
no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there
is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular
language in the written instrument which will support the claim. 9 The
reason for giving such great deference is the strong "[Qederal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration [which] would be undermined if courts
had the final say on the merits of the awards."8°
However, under the peculiar facts of Misco, this great deference could
be problematic. The Court's holding gives the arbitrator authority to make
decisions based on highly subjective facts that could potentially be beyond
his expertise. The Court reasoned that even if the arbitrator found that
Cooper had drugs in his possession on the property, he would not
necessarily have to be dismissed. If the arbitrator found as a factual matter
Cooper could be trusted not to use drugs on the job, the court of appeals
could not upset the award because of its own view that the public policy
about plant safety was threatened.8 The Court's failure to specify what
constitutes such factual trust could create problems.
The Court's opinion also permits the arbitrator to make medical
determinations regarding an employee's sobriety. In Misco, the arbitrator
recognized that operating the slitter-rewinder under the influence of drugs
was dangerous.82 Yet, in the absence of drug testing, it may be impossible
to determine if an employee was using drugs, especially if the arbitrator will
only allow evidence that the company relied upon to dismiss the employee.
If the arbitrator could not get any medical evidence to determine if Cooper
had been operating the machine under the influence, this leaves him with

76. Id
77. Id at 370.
78. Id (quoting Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960)).
79. Id (quoting American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68).
80. Id (quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
81. Id
82. Id
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less reliable avenues of determining if Cooper was using drugs on the
property, such as testimony from other employees, the employee's supervisor, or the employee's personnel records.' The general rule is that the
arbitrator's authority derives from his knowledge of the industry.8 However,
with the Court's decision, the arbitrator is allowed to make medical
decisions that go beyond industry knowledge.
Opinions in other cases following Misco have expressed concern over
giving the arbitrator authority on matters beyond their expertise. In Daniel
Construction Co. v. Local 257,'

the arbitrator awarded reinstatement and

backpay to employees who had been discharged for failing a psychological
test, which allegedly screened employees who were security risks in a nuclear
power plant.86 The court of appeals upheld this decision.8 7 In his dissent,
Senior Circuit Judge Ross said "allowing an arbitrator, who has no apparent
authority or expertise in the fields of nuclear safety or psychological testing,
to second guess the validity of security procedures which have been
approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would thwart such a public
policy."8
Arbitrators routinely consider work place safety in making their
decisions.' Their consideration reinforces the strong public policy of a safe
working environment embodied in the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 90
Congress declared its purpose to provide for the general welfare and assure
every working person healthful working conditions.91 The Act also
recognizes both the human and industrial costs associated with work place
accidents.' The Act attempts to provide for safe working conditions and
to preserve human resources by placing responsibility on both the employer
and employee in achieving the goal of a safe work place." In addition, the
Act sets out medical criteria which is to protect the workers' life and

83. The arbitrator found that Cooper had been reprimanded twice in the past few months
for deficient work performance. Id. at 368.
84. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1, 5
(D.C. Cir. 1986). The Court stated that the labor agreement "[i]s a constitution of industrial
self-government, in which the knowledgeable arbitrator plays an integral part." Id at 5.
85. 856 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1988)
86. Id at 1176.
87. aTat 1175.
88. Id at 1182.
89. See Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374 n.11.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(a).
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2).
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health.' However, that goal can be undermined in instances such as those
found in Misco when arbitrators lacking medical knowledge are allowed to
determine when employee drug usage constitutes a work place danger.
V1.

CONCLUSION

The Court's willingness to uphold the arbitrator's decision shows just
how entrenched arbitration is under the collective bargaining process. The
Court formulated a tough standard for overturning the arbitrator's decision.
By laying down this standard, the Court is strongly lending its support to
the policy of favoring alternative dispute resolution in labor agreements.
The Court also said, in effect, that it was concerned that reviewing courts
would not respect the policy of alternative dispute resolution. But by taking
a stand to protect arbitration, the Court may have subordinated the public
policy of safety in the workplace to the arbitrator's decision. A significant
burden is placed on the arbitrator by leaving matters in his hands that are
beyond his expertise. Arbitrators may be placed in the position of trying to
determine if an employee is using drugs either on or off the company's
premises without any way to test the employee. The arbitrator would also
have to determine the effect of drugs on the employee's performance.
Considering the extent of drug use in American society, the myriad of
reactions to drugs, and the potential for serious accidents and injuries, the
Court may have been better advised to make the arbitrator hear all the
relevant evidence discovered about Cooper's use of drugs and his bringing
drugs onto the company premises to fully protect the safety of the
workplace.
BRIAN DARLING

94. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(7). This section provides that "[n]o employee will suffer
diminished health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work experience."
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